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Abstract
Internet Service Provider (ISP) peering has
emerged as one of the most important and effective
ways for ISPs to improve the efficiency of operation.
Peering is defined as “an interconnection business
relationship whereby ISPs provide connectivity to
each others’ transit customers.” ISPs seek peering
relationships primarily for two reasons. First, peering
decreases the cost and reliance on purchased Internet
transit. As the single greatest operating expense, ISPs
seek to minimize these telecommunications costs.
Second, peering lowers inter-Autonomous System (AS)
traffic latency. By avoiding a transit provider hop in
between ISPs traffic between peering ISPs has lower
latency. So how is peering done?
This paper details the ISP peering decision-making
process. Interviews with Internet Service Providers1
have highlighted three distinct decision phases of the
peering process : Identification (Traffic Engineering
Data Collection and Analysis), Contact &
Qualification (Initial Peering Negotiation), and
Implementation Discussion (Peering Methodology).
The first phases identifies the who and the why, while
the last phase focuses on the how.
The appendix includes the description of a Peering
Simulation Game that has been used in workshops to
play out peering negotiations.
Introduction and Definitions
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) connect end-users
and businesses to the public Internet. They compete
with each other on price, performance, reliability, etc.
but they also must cooperate with each other to
provide global connectivity to all other attachments on
the Internet. The cooperation is explicitly stated at
demarcation points where they interconnect, called
imprecisely “peering points”. This is an imperfect
name since interconnection typically takes one of two
forms: a peering relationship or a transit relationship,
and both use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) for
routing announcement exchange. Problems arise when
the term “peering” is used interchangeably with a
“transit” relationship. To lay the groundwork for this
paper, we introduce the following working definitions.
1 Interviews with 100 ISPs over the course of two years
along with presentations of the findings to ISPs at
NANOG, RIPE and IEPG substantially validate the
findings.
Definition: Peering is the business relationship
whereby ISPs reciprocally provide to each other
connectivity to each others’ transit customers.
To illustrate peering, consider figure 1 below showing
a much simplified Internet: the Internet with only three
ISPs: WestNet, USNet, and EastNet. WestNet has
customers shown as green circles. USNet has
customers of its own (beige circles) and EastNet has
its customers shown as yellow circles.
Figure 1 - Peering and Transit relationships
In this example, WestNet has a peering relationship
with USNet in which USNet announces reachability of
its beige customers to WestNet, and WestNet
announces reachability to its green customers to
USNet. This is the essence of the peering relationship;
each ISP reciprocally provides access to each others
customers. EastNet also peers with USNet,
announcing its yellow customers to USNet while
USNet announces its blue customers to EastNet.
It is important to note that WestNet and EastNet can
not access each others customers in this configuration.
(The boxes below the ISPs show their respective
routing tables.) WestNet only knows how to get to
blue and green customers, and EastNet knows how to
reach only blue and yellow customers. The fact that
they both peer with USNet is inconsequential; peering
is a non-transitive relationship.
Since peering is a reciprocal non-transitive
relationship, EastNet and WestNet must peer with
every other ISP or find another way of accessing every
other ISP.
Definition: Transit is the business relationship
whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to
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all destinations in its routing table2.
Consider a simplistic Internet model below in
figure 2. In this picture, EastNet purchases transit
from USNet, and in return gets connectivity to all
networks in USNet’s routing table. As a customer of
USNet, USNet announces EastNet routes across all of
its peering and transit interconnections.
Transit
USNet WestNet
Peering
By EastNet purchasing transit,
EastNet is announced by USNet to
USNet Peering and Transit interconnections alike.
EastNet
… f o ra( t r a n s i t )f e eo fc o u r s e .
Figure 2 - Transit Relationship - selling access to
entire routing table
To better illustrate transit, note that there are over
8800 ISPs in the US3 alone; imagine the complexity
and cost of trying to peer with all of them! (In reality
you wouldn’t have to peer with all ISPs, but you
would need to peer with their upstream (transit)
providers to avoid transit entirely.) A more effective
demonstration of transit is shown below, showing the
opaque conglomeration of International networks
accessible via a transit relationship with a large transit
provider. Compared against the relatively small
number of routes received from a single peering
relationship, one can see that transit is a valuable and
different service from peering.
2 Note that increasingly in Europe ISPs are offering and
obtaining hybrids. For example, they may purchase
“Regional Transit” from global players in a region
without adequate coverage. In a few rare cases ISPs have
arranged “paid peering” to eliminate the cost of peering
to one or the other. INSNet and GXNet for example.
3 See the Boardwatch list: http://www.thelist.com for a list
of ISPs.
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Figure 3 - Transit Providers with large network
A sas i d en o t e ,s o m es e r v i c ep r o v i d e r s 4 prefer a transit
(customer) relationship with ISPs for business reasons,
arguing that the threat of lost revenue is greater than
the threat of terminating a peering arrangement if
performance of the interconnection agreement is
inadequate.
Now that we have introduced the notion of peering and
transit relationships and the difference between them,
we will examine the role of the Peering Coordinator.
I. Phase 1: Identification of
Potential Peer: Traffic
Engineering Data Collection and
Analysis
We spoke with over 100 peering coordinators in
this study to document how peering works, and how
they approach peering from a practical perspective.
Peering Coordinators are typically charged with
establishing and managing the interconnections
between their network and others. This multidiscipline
job crosses the boundaries of network architecture,
technical (routing logistics), business, and legal. This
job therefore requires a mix of skill sets to be executed
effectively.
We’ll first examine the peering coordinator
motivations for peering and selection of peers.
Motivations: Why Peer?
4 Conversation with Allan Leinwand, Founder of Digital
Island. Allan indicated that the financial “teeth” are
much stronger with transit ISPs than with “peers”, and
the threat of lost revenue provides better quality and
reliability in a transit relationship.DRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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Lower Transit Costs. Choices made by Internet
Service Providers (ISP) are often dominated by
telecommunications cost issues. Highest among these
costs is Internet transit service that provides the ISP
with connectivity to the global Internet. Transit Prices
for DS-3 transit for example can be as high as
$50,000/month5, and OC-3 transit can cost up to
$150,000/month6. To reduce these costs, ISPs seek
peering (zero or reduced cost) relationships with other
ISPs that provide more direct traffic exchange and
reduce the load on these expensive transit services (as
shown below).
Upstream Transit Provider
Transit
$$$
Transit
$$$
Peering $
ISP A ISP B
Figure 4 – Migrating traffic from Transit to
Peering Interconnection
Lower Latency. As a side effect of
interconnecting directly with peers, ISP customers
experience lower latency to the other ISP’s customers.
Traffic destined for a local competitor’s customers
may need to traverse a couple of transit providers and
potentially across great distances (with high latency)
before reaching the other customer. The worst
example highlighted traffic between the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia traversing an overloaded
exchange point in Washington DC7. Through direct
interconnections (using direct circuits or regional
exchange points) ISP customers realize better
performance.
Usage-based traffic billing. Some ISPs charge
customers based upon metered traffic. Since packet
5 Varies by transit provider, backhaul costs vary by circuit
miles, carrier competition, etc.
6 Dave Rand interview with the Cook Report, and Author
interview with Pat Binford-Walsh (UUNet) in 1998.
Note that the bandwidth and transit costs have dropped.
7 Consulting work with the United Arab Emerites PTT.
loss and latency slows traffic consumption, they
benefit from a lower latency, lower packet loss
Internet. It is in their best interest therefore to assure
that customers use as much bandwidth as possible by
minimizing loss and latency through effective traffic
engineering8.
Conversations with European ISPs showed
increasing adoption of the usage-based billing model.
This has motivated them to compete for traffic and
therefore revenue.
Why not peer?
On the surface peering appears to be a good idea
from a financial and technical perspective. However,
the topic has generated more heat than light due to the
following conflicts of interest between ISPs.
•  Traffic Asymmetry and Investment
asymmetry means that one party bears
more of the cost as a result of peering. For
example, consider the figure below where
Exodus peers with GTEI. Web traffic (the
dominant traffic flow on the Internet) is
inherently asymmetric. Exodus is a net
source of content, therefore more GTEI
resources (bandwidth) than Exodus
bandwidth are consumed as a result of
peering. GTEI could say that Exodus was
“dumping traffic” onto GTEI’s backbone
and GTEI was forced to “carry” the traffic
across the great distances. Meanwhile,
Exodus and Exodus customers are able to
sell advertising on their web pages and
yield great revenues off of GTEI’s
customers. In some cases ISPs will peer
without settlement up to a certain traffic
ratio (for example 4:1 traffic out to traffic
in) and then on a usage basis beyond that
on a Mbps basis9. In the Exodus-GTEI
negotiations, rumor has it that the solution
was to peer at more locations and to
engineer cold-potato10 r o u t i n gt or e d u c e
the distance the traffic had to spend on the
GTEI backbone11.
8 Interview with Avi Freedman, AboveNet.
9 Conversations with Frontier Global Center engineers at
RIPE 35 in Amsterdam.
10 Cold-potato routing is a routing discipline whereby one
ISP carries traffic as far as possible before handing it off
to another ISP.
11 “GTEI, Exodus Make Peace On Peering”, Randy Barrett,DRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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Figure 5 - ISP Traffic Asymmetry
•  There may be the potential for transit sales
if they don’t peer12. Some ISPs will not
peer if there is any existing or pending
customer-provider relationship between
the parties, even if the sale is completely
unrelated to interconnection (i.e. fiber sale
or colo sale)13.
•  Peering consumes resources (router
interface slots, circuits, staff time, etc.)
that could otherwise be applied to revenue
generation. Router slots, cards,
interconnection costs of circuits or
Internet Exchange environments, staff
install time are incremental
expenditures14. Further, operating costs,
particularly for peering sessions with ISPs
without the necessary on-call engineering
talent, can require increased processing
power for filters and absorb time better
suited to paying customers.
•  Motivation not to commoditize IP transit.
Tier 1 ISPs15 compete on the basis of
Inter@ctive Week, September 16, 1998 and
anonymous interviews with parties involved with the
negotiations.
12 A case recited to the author: Level 3 refused to peer with
GST Networks in the Washington DC area since GST
was a Level 3 transit customer in New England. While
technically the request could be accommodated, Level 3
rationally preferred the transit revenue.
13 Apricot 2000 presentation by Lauren Nowlin, Onyx,
March 2, 2000 in Seoul, Korea on “Peering and
Interconnection Panel” with the author.
15 Tier 1 ISPs are defined as ISPs with global coverage and
a full Internet routing table without acquiring transit
better performance. They accomplish
better performance due to the large
customer base of direct attachments and
high-speed interconnections with other
Tier 1 ISPs. Since peering with other ISPs
improves the performance of the “peer” it
effectively makes them a more powerful
competitor. Therefore, there is a strong
disincentive to peer and increase the
number of top tier competitors.
•  As a “peer” there are no Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) to guarantee rapid
repair of problems. Both parties benefit
from the reparation of outages, and may
even have clauses in the peering
agreements to work diligently to repair the
problem. However, a customer
relationship (with or without SLAs)
generally has more contractual teeth
(financial repercussion for failure to
perform).
Traffic Ratio-based Peering. As a result of
these forces, a traffic ratio-based paid peering
model is emerging. In this approach, peering
is free until traffic asymmetry reaches a certain
ratio (4:1 is common). At this point, the net
source of traffic will pay the net sink of traffic
a fee based upon traffic flow above this ratio.
With Whom to Peer?
If peering makes sense from a technical and
financial perspective, the next question is, “With
whom should we peer?” To identify potential peers,
ISPs use a variety of criteria.
Quantities of traffic distributed between networks
often sets the pace of the negotiation; to quantify this,
ISPs may systematically sample inbound and
outbound traffic flows. Flows then are mapped to
originating AS, and calculations are made to determine
where peering (direct interconnections) would most
reduce the load on the expensive transit paths. There is
substantial work involved here, as this traffic sampling
results in a large number of data. Alternative
measurement methods include measuring port
statistics16.
Many peering coordinators indicated that peering
selection is accomplished by intuition17. Their sense
from any ISP.
16 Avi Freedman, AboveNet citing ATM and other switch
measurement methods in use.
17 NANOG 17, Montreal, Peering Birds Of a Feather (BOF)
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was that they knew where traffic was and would be
headed.
In either case, the end result of this first phase is
list of the top 10 ISP candidates for peering.
Interviews with Peering Coordinators highlighted a
few other considerations.
Broader business arrangements between ISPs
may circumvent the peering negotiation phase and
expedite discussions directly to Phase III, the peering
methodology negotiation phase.
Peering policies range across a wide spectrum
from “open peering policy” meaning “we will peer
with anyone”, to “if you have to ask, we won’t peer
with you.18” Peering policies are often exposed only
under Non-disclosure agreements, and these policies
reduce the number and type of ISPs that are peering
candidates.
In many cases peering requires interconnections at
multiple peering points, explicit specifications for
routing, migration from public (shared switch) peering
to private (non-shared switch) peering after a certain
traffic volume is reached, etc. It is beyond the scope of
this document to fully explore the technical and
political motivation for peering policies; it is sufficient
to be aware that these discussions can be cumbersome
and require a combination of technical and financial
negotiation.
The greatly simplified peer qualification decision
tree looks something like this:
meeting held by author when about two-thirds of the
audience indicated that they use ad-hoc, predictive, or
intuition for selecting peering candidates.
18 Sentiment articulated by Sean Doran, shortly after leaving
SprintLink. Peering policies are a politically sensitive
subject, and peering policies are often not explicitly
articulated.
Part
of a larger
business Transaction?
Will
Peering
Have a positive
affect on my
network?
Large
New Customer Impact
expected?
Traffic
transiting expensive
transit service?
Dominant Traffic
Flow?
Phase 1
Proceed to Phase 2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Figure 6- Phase 1 of Peering Selection Decision
Tree
Once the measurements have been made and
analyzed, and it appears to be beneficial to peer, the
ISP enters into Phase 2, Contact & Qualification,
Initial Peering Negotiation.
Emerging Migration Path from Transit to
Peering. Interviews with tier 2 ISPs highlighted an
emerging peering transition strategy:
1) Access the Internet via transit from a global
provider,
2) Pursue peering arrangements on public
switches at exchange points to reduce load on
transit links and improve performance
3) Migrate high traffic public peering
interconnections to private interconnections
(via fiber or direct circuits).
4) Ultimately migrate traffic away from transit
purchase and negotiate (free or for-fee)
peering with former transit provider.
To illustrate this path, consider Telia, a global ISP
based in Sweden. Telia analyzed their transit
costs and recognized that approximately 85% of
their traffic at MAE-East was to their transit
provider and the remaining 15% was through
peering relationships. By focusing on establishing
peering relationships with the top 25 destination
ASes they shifted the mix to 70% through private
peering at an exchange with the remaining 30% of
traffic heading toward their transit provider19.
19 Interview with Anne Gibbens (Telia)DRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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The result was increased traffic efficiency and a
reduction in the cost of transit20.
It should be stated that phase four of the migration
strategy listed above may be overly optimistic
and/or challenging for several reasons. First,
transit providers prefer paying customers to peers.
Second, transit providers typically have much
more ubiquitous network infrastructure than their
customers, and therefore will not see their
customers as equal contributors. Finally, the
transit providers have an incentive to reduce the
number of their own competitors.
To illustrate this migration path, Raza Rizvi
(REDNET) said “We had to leave our upstream
provider for 16 months with alternative access to
their route before they considered us not as a
customer lost but as a potential peering partner.“
After the top 10 potential peers are identified,
peering coordinators proceed to Phase 2: Contact
& Qualification, Initial Peering Negotiation.
II. Phase 2: Contact & Qualification,
Initial Peering Negotiation
Internet Service Providers typically have a person
or group specifically tasked with peering and traffic
engineering issues. For example, UUNet has a
“Peering Steering Committee” to evaluate peering
requests21. Some variations of the following steps
lead to the parties either leaving the negotiation or
proceeding to peering methodology discussions.
Interviews have highlighted a key challenge for
ISPs. Finding the right person to speak with at the
target ISP is a difficult and time intensive process.
Peering Coordinators change jobs and there is no
standard way to find out who handles this task.
Mergers and acquisitions cloud lines of
communication. Even if the name is known, Peering
Coordinators are often traveling, way behind in e-mail,
and prioritizing e-mail based on the subject or the
sender. This is where “people networking” helps a
great deal, and hiring expertise for their contacts
speeds this initial contact process up quite a bit. In
some cases, peering is expedited between ISPs simply
because the decision makers have a previous
20 As compared with growing the transit connection.
21 Point made by Paul McNulty at the 1999 Apricot Session
titled “Next Generation Internet Infrastructure”.
relationship22. This was the dominant mode of
operation in the early days of the Internet.
In any case, peering contacts are initiated in one of
the following ways:
a) via electronic mail, using the pseudo
standard peering@<ispdomain>.net or a
personal contact,
b) from contacts listed on an exchange point
participant list,
c) with tech-c or admin-c from DNS or ASN
registries,
d ) i n f o r m a lm e e t i n gi na ne n g i n e e r i n gf o r u m
like NANOG, IETF, RIPE, etc.,
e) at trade shows from introductions among
speakers, or with booth staff,
f) from the target ISP sales force,
g) from the target ISP NOC,
h) as part of a larger business transaction.
Second, mutual non-disclosures agreements
(NDAs) may be negotiated and signed, and a
discussion of peering policy and prerequisites follow.
Note that NDAs are an optional step, and many ISPs
do not require signed NDAs prior to discussions23.
Traffic engineering discussions and data disclosure
may be used to justify the peering relationship. Each
ISP typically has a set of requirements for peering that
include peering at some number of geographically
distributed locations, sometimes at public exchange
points.
Traffic volume is usually a key determining factor.
The decision rule hinges upon whether or not there is
sufficient savings from peering to justify spending
capital on a port on a router and/or a portion of the
interconnection costs or augmenting existing capacity
into an exchange point. A Bilateral Peering
Agreement24(BLPA) is the legal form that details each
parties understanding of acceptable behavior, and
defines the arms length interactions that each would
agreed to.
22 Discussion with Vab Goel, former VP of Engineering at
Qwest.
23 NANOG Peering BOF, NANOG 17 in Montreal, about
70 Peering Coordinators of 125 indicated they do not
require NDAs.
24 See http://www.linx.net/joininfo/peering-
template/agreement-v4.html for sample BLPADRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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Another motivation for peering to factor in
includes lower latency and/or more regional
distribution of traffic than existing connections allow.
This process is diagrammed below.
Contacts
within the broader business
Transaction?
Do both
parties find motivation
to continue peering
discussion?
Contact at
Operations
Forums?
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Peering@ or personal
Contact?
Phase 2
P r o c e e dt oP h a s e3
Yes
Yes
Contact with
Exchange Point contact
List?
Contact
Using DNS/ASN
Registry?
Contact at Trade
Shows?
Contact via
Sales
Force?
(optionally) Sign NDA
Share traffic statistics, Policies, BLPA,
I.e. justification why
they should both peer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
End Peering Discussion No
Yes
Figure 7 – Phase 2: Contact & Qualification
Decision Tree
After this initial discussion, either party may
decide to walk away from the peering discussions until
certain criteria are met25. If both parties agree that
their requirements are sufficiently met to discuss
methodology (they both benefit from the peering
relationship), they move onto Phase 3: Implementation
Discussions.
III. Phase 3: Implementation Discussions:
Peering Methodology
Since peering is seen as being of mutual benefit,
both parties now explore the interconnection
method(s) that will most effectively exchange traffic.
The primary goal is to establish point(s) of
interconnection, and secondarily detail optimal traffic
exchange behavior (using Multi-Exit Discriminators
(MEDs) or other traffic weighting techniques).
To interconnect, ISPs face two distinct options:
Direct Circuit Interconnection or Exchange-Based
Interconnection (or some global combination thereof).
25 According to participants at the NANOG17 Peering BOF
led by the author, government agencies in Israel and
Australia forced ISP peering!
The “Interconnection Strategies for ISPs” white
paper26 quantifies the economics and technical
tradeoffs between the first two options. To summarize
this report, the preferred methodology depends on the
number of peers participating in the region and
bandwidth required for its regional interconnections.
ISPs that expect to interconnect at high or rapidly
increasing bandwidth within the region, or expect
interconnections with more than five parties in the
region prefer the exchange-based solution. Those that
do not anticipate a large number of regional
interconnects prefer direct-circuits and typically decide
to split the costs of interconnection with the peer by
region. On occasion the costs are covered in whole by
one peer27.
Interconnection Method
Direct-Circuit
Interconnection
Exchange-Based
Interconnection
Figure 8 – ISP Physical Interconnection
Methods
For direct-circuit interconnects, key issues center
upon interconnection location(s) and who pays for and
manages the interconnection. This becomes a material
cost issue as traffic grows and circuits increase in size
and cost.
In either case, ISPs generally have the following
goals for establishing peering:
1. get peering set up as soon as possible,
2. minimize the cost of the interconnection and
transit costs,
3. maximize the benefits of a systematic approach to
peering,
26 Interconnection Strategies for ISPs, W. B. Norton,
June99,presentation: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-
9905/norton.html. A copy of this report can be requested
via e-mail to wbn@umich.edu.
27 Interviews found a pattern in which PSINet would peer
with ISPs provided that peer covered all interconnection
costs.DRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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4. execute the regional operations plan as strategy
dictates (may be architecture/network
development group goal), and
5. fulfill obligations of larger business agreement.
Exchange Environment Selection Criteria
This section details the selection criteria an ISP
typically uses when selecting an exchange. Note that
these issues are listed in no particular order. These
issues are shown graphically as flowcharts and
discussed in detail in the paragraphs below.
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Figure 9 - Exchange Environment Selection
Telecommunications Access Issues
T h e s ei s s u e sh a v et od ow i t hg e t t i n g
telecommunications services into the exchange. How
fast can circuits be brought into the interconnection
environment? How many carriers compete for
business for circuits back to my local Point of
Presence (POP)? For facilities-based ISPs, what is the
cost of trenching into the exchange (how far away and
what obstacles present themselves)? Are there nearby
fiber providers that lease strands? These questions will
help answer the most important question to ISPs: How
fast can my peer and I get connectivity into the
exchange? Multiple carriers lead to speed and cost
efficiencies. Some ISPs have volume deals with
certain carriers or otherwise prefer carriers and
therefore prefer exchanges where these carriers can
quickly provision circuits. These answers strongly
impact the desirability of the exchange environment.
Deployment Issues
These issues have to do with getting equipment
into the exchange. How do I get my equipment into the
exchange (assuming it supports collocation)? Do I ship
equipment in or do I have to bring it with me as I fly
in? Will someone act as remote hands and eyes to get
the equipment into the racks or do I do the installation
myself? Comparing exchange environments in this
context, what are the costs associated with deployment
(travel, staff time, etc.) into this exchange? Does the
exchange have sufficient space, power, air
conditioning, etc. The answers to these questions
impact the deployment schedule for the ISP(s)
engineers and the costs of the interconnection method.
ISP Current Presences Issues
This issue is based on the following observation by
the peering coordinators: The most inexpensive and
expedient peering arrangements are the ones made
between ISPs that are already located in the same
exchange. There is a hidden assumption here that
there is sufficient capacity to interconnect at the
exchange. Cross-connects or switching fabrics can
easily establish peering within a few hours or at most
days. ISPs will prefer to interact where one or both ISP
already has a presence.
Operations Issues
These issues focus on the ongoing operations
activities allowed within the exchange after initial
installation. Does the exchange allow private network
interconnections? Are there requirements to connect to
a central switch? How is access and security handled
at the facility28? Is there sufficient power, HVAC,
capacity at the switch, space for additional racks, real
time staff support29? Is it easy to upgrade my
presence over time? Upgrading in this context means
the ability to increase the speed of circuits into the
exchange, the ability to purchase dark fiber, the ability
to increase the number of racks and cross connects in
the exchange, the ease of increasing the speed of
interconnection. ISPs will prefer bandwidth-rich, ISP-
friendly exchanges over those with restrictions over
future operations.
Business Issues
“Bandwidth, strategic partner alliances, and
corporate ties often override the technical
28 For example, the NSPIXP is a major exchange in Japan
yet has no staff on-site so engineers need to be called in
for support. Escorted access could take hours to be
coordinated.
29 MAE-East has been widely criticized for being a major
interconnection point in the US without sufficient
infrastructure (power, A/C) to support expansion.DRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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justification30.” – Lauren Nowlin, Peering Coordinator
for Onyx Networks.
Perhaps the most far-reaching issue is strategic: do
we want to support this exchange operator, and do
their interests enhance or conflict with ours?
Will using this exchange support a competitor
(contribute to their net income, their credibility, their
positioning)? A neutrally operated exchange (defined
as one that is not owned or aligned with any carrier,
fiber provider, or ISP) provides an open distortion-free
marketplace for carrier and ISP services.
Market distortions often result when an exchange is
owned by one of its participants. This often manifests
itself in requirements (required use of their carrier or
ISP services) that constrain the market for services
within the exchange31. Since it is difficult and
disruptive to move equipment out of an exchange,
ISPs will prefer a neutrally operated exchange
e n v i r o n m e n tt h a tw i l ln o ts u f f e rf r o mm a r k e t
distortions and limitations due to business conflicts of
interest.
Cost Issues
This broad issue crosses all other issues. What is
the cost of using this exchange? What are the rack
fees, cross connect fees, port fees, installation fees?
What are the future operating fees going to be? What
are the motivations and parameters surrounding these
fees? Cost issues shadow most of the other issues
listed in this paper. All else being equal, ISPs will seek
to minimize the costs, particularly upfront costs,
associated with the interconnection for peering.
Credibility Issue
The credibility issue is twofold.
First, credibility goes to the financial support of the
exchange. Does the exchange exist today and will it
exist tomorrow? During the early stages of the
exchange, ISPs are asked to make a leap of faith when
committing, and therefore prefer an exchange with
strong backing and the credibility to survive.
30 Discussions at NANOG 17 in Montreal.
31 MAE-East is owned and operated by MCI Worldcom and
requires use of MCI circuits to access MAE-East
services. Exodus requires use of its network and at one
point restricted direct access between ISPs and Carriers.
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First CP(s) Critical Mass Point (Vexchange=CostExchange)
Large
Facility Scaling
Figure 10 - Value of exchange varies over
population
Second, does the exchange operator have the
backing and credibility to attract the more valuable
peering candidates? Since the value of the exchange
(shown in the graph below) is proportional to the
number and type of participants. Does this exchange
have the backing to attract my peers? Who is
managing the exchange and what technology is in use?
These answer signal the credibility and survivability of
the exchange. ISPs will prefer an exchange with
credibility – one that is financially and technically well
backed and likely to attract the most desirably peering
candidates.
Exchange Population Issues
These issues focus on the side benefits to using this
exchange. Are there other ISPs at this exchange that
are peering candidates? Are there transit sales possible
at the exchange? In the context of the credibility issue
discussed above, who will likely be at the exchange in
the future, and when will the cost of participation
equal the value of the interconnection (also known as
the Critical Mass Point)? ISPs will prefer an
established and well-populated exchange, particularly
one with potential customers that can generate
revenue.
Existing Exchange vs. New Exchange?
There are many operational exchange points in
each region of the U.S. There are also emerging (soon
to exist) exchanges that may be considered as peering
points. However, given the pace of ISP expansion, it is
unlikely that emerging exchange offerings are
differentiated or compelling enough to be preferred
over existing exchanges. Chronic traffic congestion
can influence the decision to plan to peer in an existing
malfunctioning exchange or wait until a better
exchange opens. Customers with heavy flows ofDRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
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regional traffic can also influence the decision. Long
term benefits (scalability) may lead to preferring a
next generation exchange. However, all else
considered equal, ISPs generally prefer an existing
exchange to an emerging one.
One Final Note on Exchange Criteria:
Weighting
The ISPs we spoke with shared with us varied
weightings of the importance of each of these issues.
To some, the most important issues were the business
issues, and others weighted more heavily the
operations issues. Each ISP places higher or lower
importance on different issues and not surprisingly
select their operations environment based on their
specific criteria.
IV. Summary
This paper provides a rough description of the
decision processes ISPs follow to identify and
establish peering relationships. It explores the
implementation phase and the criteria for exchange
point selection.
The results of the interviews with ISP Peering
Coordinators can be summarized with the following
observations:
1) ISPs seek peering primarily to reduce transit
costs and improve performance (lower latency).
2) Peering goals for ISPs include a) get peering
set up as soon as possible, b) minimize the cost
of the interconnection and their transit costs, c)
maximize the benefits of a systematic approach
to peering, d) execute the regional operations
plan as strategy dictates (may be
architecture/network development group goal),
and e) fulfill obligations of larger business
agreement.
3) The selection of an exchange environment is
made relatively late in the peering process.
4) ISPs highlighted 9 selection criteria for
selection of exchange environment:
telecommunications access issues, deployment
issues, current presences, operations issues,
exchange population, cost issues, and
credibility of the exchange environment
operator. ISPs weight these issues differently
and will prefer and exchange environment that
best suit these needs.
5) One major challenge facing Peering
Coordinators is the identification of potential
peers and initiating discussions.
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Appendix A – Calculating the Financial
Benefits of Peering
Since the cost of transit is substantially higher32 than
the typically zero cost of peering, ISPs try to reduce
this cost with peering relationships. Before we discuss
the tactics used to establish peering, we will take a
brief diversion to quantify the financial value of the
peering.
The Financial Value of Peering
Peering is seen as so valuable that companies are
acquired because of pre-existing peering
relationships33. But how does one assess the value
peering relationships? A rough approximation can
be34 made by measuring the traffic flow across the
peering connections and comparing the cost of that
traffic if sent across a transit interconnection. One can
then use a perpetual annuity function to roughly value
the peering sessions. To be complete one would have
to factor in (at least modest) growth in traffic
traversing that peering session, the chances of peering
termination, improved performance and effect on
customer retention, and a variety of other factors.
Upstream Transit Provider
Transit
$$$
Transit
$$$
Peering $
ISP A ISP B
Example: In a simple example, assume that ISP A and
ISP B both pay for transit at a transit fee of
$100,00035 per month for an OC-3 (155 Mbps) worth
32 We’ll show some actual transit price quotes from a
previous research study. You can also look at the
Boardwatch annual survey for this data also.
33 Anonymous source claims GeoNet was acquired by Level
3 primarily because of its rich peering relationships, and
NextLink purchased Concentric for the same reason.
34 Conversation with Nigel Titley (Level3) where they
calculated the peering cost savings to Level 3 in the
millions.
35 Price quotes from interview with Dave Rand early 1999.
of transit. Assume further that one-tenth (15.5 Mbps)
of that is traffic between ISP A and ISP B. If ISP A
and ISP B agree to peer over a large point-to-point
(OC-3) at $11,400/month36, each pays half of that
cost37, and each pays for an interface card to support
private peering over that circuit, both ISP A and ISP B
reduce their transit load by 10%38.
Assume a peering coordinator establishes one
peering session this year. One can approximate the
financial value of a peering coordinator by the cost
savings to the ISP:
10% savings on the transit OC-3: $10,000
-monthly cost of peering: $11,400/2=$ 5,570
= $5,430/month * 12months = $66,840/year
Note 1: These cost figures are highly variable and
are based on early 1999 quotes. Since then the prices
have dropped dramatically, and ISPs have started
offering tiered pricing. Fundamentally this doesn’t
change the dynamic; peering over point to point telco
circuits (or less expensively over private cross
connects within an exchange) has a profound effect on
the cost of telecommunications for ISPs.
Note 2: Since only 10% of the interconnect is used
between these two ISPs a smaller lower cost circuit
could suffice. This approach allows the
interconnection to scale and helps ensure that this
interconnection is not a congestion point for some
time.
Note 3: This is a financial benefit and ignores the
decreased latency and perhaps decreased packet loss
that leads to increased traffic. This benefit ultimately
results in more bandwidth usage and therefore more
revenue for usage-based ISPs. This additional revenue
effect is ignored in this calculation.
36 The circuit prices we used were taken directly from a
carrier in the Ashburn, VA area. We were quoted an
OC-3 for $11,400/month and OC-12 for $23,000/month.
37 See the Interconnection Strategies for ISPs white paper
describing
38 Lots of assumptions here: each ISP will save 10% if
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Appendix B – European Peering
Differences
During research for this paper we found several
distinct differences between the US and Europe in
terms of peering in practice. For example, rather than
only peering or transit, the Europeans more commonly
bought or sold partial transit.
Interestingly enough, the peering wasn’t based
upon Europeans gaining partial transit access to the
US, but rather European ISPs getting partial transit
access to other European cities! It was seen as far
cheaper to buy transit to European cities from a single
provider already expanded into those areas than to
build across international boundaries themselves. Long
haul circuits and fiber to the US and establishing
peering on the East coast with other US players was
seen as relatively easy.
Peering Full Transit Paid Peering Partial Transit
$0 $ $$ $$$
Customer
Routes Only
Customer
Routes Only
Customer
&R e g i o n a l
Routes All RoutesDRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
13 Comments to the Author Welcome
<wbn@equinix.com>
Appendix B: Peering Decision Tree Part
of a larger
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Have a positive
affect on my
network?
Large
New Customer Impact
expected?
Traffic
transiting expensive
transit service?
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Peering@ or personal
Contact?
Phase 2
Proceed to Phase 3
Yes
Yes
Contact with
Exchange Contact
List?
Contact
Using DNS/ASN
Registry?
Contact at Trade
Shows?
Contact via
Sales
Force?
(optionally) Sign NDA
Share traffic statistics, Policies, BLPA,
I.e. justification why
they should both peer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
End Peering Discussion No
Yes
Telecom
Access
Issues
Deployment
Issues
ISP
Current
Presences
Issue
Operations
Issues
Business
Issues
Cost
Issues
Exchange
Credibility
Issues
Does
This exchange
Have the credibility
T ob r i n gi na t t r a c t i v e
ISP Peers?
Does
This exchange Have
the financial backing
To survive?
Exchange
Population
Issues
Existing v.
Emerging
Exchange
Issues
Weigh Credibility
Are
We in
there?
Are
they
in?
A d d1t os c o r e
A d d1t os c o r e
Weigh Current
Presences
Does
Exchange
exist
today?
Weigh Existing
v. Emerging
A d d1t os c o r e
Fiber
Vendors in
exchange?
Multiple
Carriers?
Weigh Telecom
Access
Deploy
+Install gear
easy?
Weigh Deployment
Are there
Others there
That I’d
Like to
Peer with?
Weigh Exchange
Population Weigh Operations
Issues
Weigh Business
Issues
Weigh Cost
Issues
Private
Peering
Allowed?
Is the
total cost In line
With the
Benefits?
Does
Participation
Support
Competitor?
Scales
Well?
Security
Meets
Req’s?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
NoDRAFT Peering Decision Tree W. B. Norton
14 Comments to the Author Welcome
<wbn@equinix.com>
Appendix C – Peering Simulation Game
Setting
In order to illustrate the strategic and financial role
peering plays in an ISPs strategy, we created a peering
simulation game39. In this game, four ISPs (A, B, C,
D) seek to maximize their revenues and minimize
their costs. The revenues are determined by the
number of regions or “squares” they occupy
representing their market coverage and a quantum of
content traffic (revenue) that market generates. The
costs are determined by the number of squares that
others occupy, representing the transit expense to
access the rest of the Internet. The game board is
shown below.
The Board
A
C
B
D
Transit Provider X
Transit Provider Y
IXW IXE
IXN
IXS
Y Y
X X
Figure 11 - The Peering Simulation Game
Play. Each ISP rolls the die and selects the number
of squares indicated by the die, building into the
exchange points desired. For each square occupied,
39 First played at the Interconnect Billing and Accounting
write your name in the square and collect $2,000
transit revenue. The ISP must then pay its upstream
transit provider (shown as Transit Provider X or
Transit Provider Y around the border of the board)
$1,000 for each square the other ISPs own. The ISP
fills in the score card and (if at an exchange point) can
proceed to the peering negotiation stage.
Peering Negotiation. ISPs can reduce their transit
costs by building into an exchange point and peering
with the other ISPs there. If both ISPs agree to peer,
the transit costs to the other peer’s squares are
eliminated. (Both ISPs’ transit costs are reduced by the
number of squares the other ISP occupies). However,
the ISPs must collectively cover the cost of peering
($2,000 per round and two lost turns), split however
they see fit. (This is the peering negotiation.)
Objective
Generate as much revenue as possible by growing
your network and establish peering or transit
relationships to reduce network costs. Play is ended
when any player can no longer execute a play (when
the board is filled up). The winner is the player with
the most money at the end of the game.
Variations
Transit Sales Negotiation (Optional). ISPs can
buy/sell transit to each other at a reduced rate of
$500/square. In the transit sale, the transit provider
gets the $500/square transit revenue and the transit
purchaser saves $500/square (compared with buying
transit at $1000/square). The cost of transit ($2,000
per round and two lost turns) is identical to the cost of
peering and is split however the ISPs negotiate.
Merger and Acquisition (Optional). ISPs can
agree to pool their interests and merge into a single
ISP. There is functionally no difference in play except
money can flow between the players and the new
merged company gets two turns. Transit fees must be
Workshop, London March 16, 2000
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paid until the two ISPs peer.
How this simulation is different from peering
reality:
1. The board is veiled allowing for gaming and
bluffing during peering negotiations
2. ISPs move serially in the game, while in the
real world action is parallel.
3. The meaning of the board squares is severely
overloaded to mean regional coverage and
corresponding revenue, a quantum of traffic
generated, and a quantum of traffic transitted
to all others. All customers are not equal in
revenue, traffic.
4. Customer transit revenue gained does not
cause any additional financial load for the ISP
in the game.
5. Traffic quantum is a vague notion that
ignores the asymmetric nature of traffic
today.
6. Shared squares should cause revenue and
costs to be divided
7. Everyone starts with the same number of
squares.
8. Everyone is financially backed to support
infinite periods of financial loss. Well, that
may reflect reality for some period of Internet
time.
9. If ISPs fail to peer they must pay transit to get
access to these squares. In reality, content
multi-homes allowing alternative paths to the
same content.
10. Business motivations to sell transit instead of
peer are an ignored dynamic in the game.
Summary
The basic peering game does a good job of
highlighting the issues ISPs face when peering.
Several comments from ISPs offering
enhancements add reality to the game at the cost
of complexity. For example, ISPs capture market
share in order to be an attractive acquisition
target. Adding merger rules adds a real
complexity, somewhat tangentially related to
peering and transit. Adding rules for ISPs to
buy/sell transit to each other similarly adds
complexity but adds a negotiating dynamic that
ISPs face today. Balancing the desire to explain
and explore against the desire for the simulation to
match reality has proven to be a challenge.